

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 1, 2013

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending February 1, 2013

**F-Tank Farms:** During the back shift, firefighters quickly extinguished a fire inside a trailer used for clean anti-contamination clothing storage and entering/exiting a contamination area. The trailer is located slightly more than sixteen feet away from the 2F Evaporator. The cause of the fire is still under investigation, but smoke and flames were seen coming from a window heating/air conditioning unit. The fire did not release any radioactive material or chemicals. A small source was located inside the trailer and containers of mercury and totes with residual sodium hydroxide were stored on the outside of the trailer. Responding firefighters were not informed of either of these chemicals

**Recommendation 2012-1:** The site reps and other members of the Board's staff met with the DOE and SRNS teams who are dedicated to the resolution of Recommendation 2012-1 *Savannah River Site Building 235-F Safety*. The site personnel are very willing to work with the Board's staff to ensure the success of the recommendations. They have presented plans to remove or encapsulate a majority of the fixed combustibles in the facility as well as a plan to reduce the potential energy sources within the building. DOE is planning to conduct additional training after interviews determined that some employees in facilities near 235-F did not fully understand how they were to respond in case of a radiological release from 235-F. In addition, SRNS has decided to form a team to identify and evaluate possible methods for improving the effectiveness of "remain indoors" as a protective action for 235-F radiological releases.

**H-Canyon:** After seeing an increase in the dissolver liquid level and a reduction in the solution specific gravity, SRNS is investigating whether one of the dissolver coils has a leak. The current charge in the dissolver is 95% dissolved.

**Defense Waste Processing Facility:** Since last July, the canister production rate has dramatically slowed down as SRR dealt with two specific administrative control (SAC) violations, a potential inadequacy in the safety analysis, equipment failures, pluggage in the process vessel vent system, and a planned outage. For example, the cycle time for waste in the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) and the Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME) increased 260+% after corrective actions were imposed in response to the SAC violations. Since then, SRR has implemented a number of process, equipment, and safety analysis changes that have reduced the cycle time impact. SRR is still not sure why the current sludge batch has encountered more frequent SRAT and SME pressure spikes, but better trained operators and a new software change have significantly improved DWPF's ability to detect when sludge is carried over into the SME Condensate Tank.

**Citizens Advisory Board (CAB):** The site rep attended the local CAB. DOE and NNSA personnel gave presentations regarding the status of their activities at SRS. Several of the discussions involved the status of activities within liquid waste operations; however much of the discussion reserved until System Plan 18 is issued sometime later this spring.